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ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENTS
AMONG COLLEGES
EUGENE D. GULLAND, * J. PETER BYRNE**
and SHELDON ELLIOT STEINBACH***
INTRODUCTION
HE Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Board of Regents,' will address
for the first time the application of the antitrust laws to associa-
tional agreements among colleges and universities. Under review is a
court of appeals decision holding that certain National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) regulations and related exclusive con-
tracts with two television networks and a cable system for televising
college football games violate the Sherman Act,2 whether judged by a
per se rule or rule of reason analysis. 3
Perhaps the most important-and surprising- aspect of the case is
that both lower court decisions and the parties before the Supreme
Court analyze the antitrust implications of the NCAA's contracts as if
universities were profit-seeking firms competing in economic mar-
kets.4 This unprecedented view overlooks the more humanistic goals
of college education in general and amateur athletics in particular.
The potential impact of NCAA, moreover, is not limited to intercol-
legiate football. Courts that have entertained antitrust cases involving
agreements among educational institutions have invariably deter-
mined either that the Sherman Act should not be applied, or that
school practices having commercial aspects should be judged by a rule
of reason standard.5 If the per se rule applies to restrictions such as
* A.B. 1969, Princeton University; J.D. 1972, Yale Law School; Member,
District of Columbia Bar.
* * B.A. 1973, Northwestern University; M.A. 1976, University of Virginia;
J.D. 1979, University of Virginia School of Law; Member, District of Columbia Bar.
*** B.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1966, Columbia University
School of Law; M.A.P.A. 1968, University of Minnesota; Member, District of Col-
umbia Bar.
1. 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982), af'd in part and remanded in part,
707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
3. 707 F.2d at 1157.
4. See id. at 1152-60; 546 F. Supp. at 1320-21; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
10-16, NCAA.
5. See infra pts. II(A), (B). The "rule of reason" test for whether an agreement
violates the Sherman Act requires examination of whether the agreement unreason-
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those at issue in NCAA, courts may be foreclosed from considering in
future antitrust cases the noncommercial interests of other educational
associations whose challenged activities have commercial aspects and
consequences.
This Article takes no position on whether, under application of a
proper rule of reason analysis, the NCAA television contracts and
regulations violate the Sherman Act. It does argue that the rule of
reason is the appropriate analysis for determining the legality of such
agreements, because it is flexible enough to take adequate account of
the NCAA's noncommercial educational objectives in regulating ama-
teur athletics in addition to the economic criteria ordinarily applied to
commercial professions or businesses. The per se rule, which by defini-
tion precludes any inquiry into the history and purposes of a chal-
lenged practice, 6 lacks this flexibility and must therefore be rejected.
1. THE NCAA DECISIONS IN THE LowER COURTS
A. Conflicting Goals of NCAA Members
NCAA was brought by two universities that traditionally have
fielded strong intercollegiate football teams, the Universities of Okla-
homa and Georgia.7 The defendant, the NCAA, is a non-profit orga-
nization of approximately nine hundred institutions of higher educa-
tion that meet specified academic standards. For almost eighty years,
colleges and universities have sought through the NCAA to promote
intercollegiate athletics, preserve the ideals of amateurism, and ensure
that school-sponsored athletic competition resists encroaching influ-
ences of commercialism and professionalism that are alien to the
paramount educational objectives.8
ably restrains competition in the particular circumstances of a case. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 65-66 (1911). Certain practices-such as price fixing-are held to be unlawful
"per se" because courts have concluded, after extensive experience with such prac-
tices, that they tend nearly always to suppress competition and have no redeeming
virtue. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Accordingly, practices that have been found to
be unlawful per se are condemned in individual cases without extensive examination
of their competitive effects. Deciding whether a practice in a particular industry falls
under a per se category, however, can require analysis as extensive as that used in
rule of reason cases. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 351-57 (1982); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-24; Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S.
at 692-96.
6. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
7. See NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1282.
8. See id.; Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysts, 87
Yale L.J. 655, 656-57 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics].
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As NCAA amply demonstrates, it is not easy to strike a balance
among the means for attaining these goals that fully satisfies all
schools. Some take special pride in their identification with strong,
nationally-ranked teams and resent NCAA rules that they believe
hinder their teams' athletic prowess or interfere with their financial
affairs. Other schools view college football programs as fostering qual-
ities of cooperation and teamwork among student athletes, as well as
providing a focal point for student and alumni identification with
their college or university. These schools fear that uninhibited "big-
time" football could undermine the traditional ideals of amateurism
they believe are fundamental to NCAA football, and could place
intercollegiate athletics on a collision course with broader educational
goals."
Television broadcasts of college football games are unquestionably
a source of substantial revenues for the NCAA and many of its mem-
bers. There is no unanimity among the schools, however, on such
issues as the regulations, if any, that should govern television broad-
casts, the allocation of broadcast revenues among schools, and the
desirability of limitations designed to preserve athletic balance and to
restrain commercial and professional influences.' 0
B. The Challenged NCAA Regulations
The particular regulations challenged are the NCAA Television
Plan (Plan) and the underlying NCAA contracts with CBS, ABC and
Turner Broadcasting. " These regulations were adopted to protect live
attendance at games and to preserve the balance of athletic competi-
tion. 12 Specifically, they limit the total number of college football
games to be broadcast, 13 the maximum number of appearances by
9. See Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 8, at 657 n.9.
10. See, e.g., NCAA, 546 F. Supp at 1285-87 (intercollegiate dispute regarding
telecasting of football games); Warner Amex Cable Co. v. ABC, 499 F. Supp. 537,
543 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (intercollegiate dispute regarding cablecasting of football
games).
11, NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1149.
12. Id. at 1153. The NCAA first promulgated controls on the televising of foot-
ball games in 1953. 546 F. Supp. at 1283. Those rules, adopted in response to
concerns that televising games limited gate attendance at other college football
games, were quite restrictive. In the 1950's, only one game could be televised each
Saturday afternoon, and a school could only appear once each season. Id.
13. ABC and CBS each can present 14 "exposures" of football each season, with
multiple regional telecasts on one day considered a single exposure; the Turner cable
network can present 19 evening games. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, NCAA.
The Plan and contracts also permit limited local "exception" telecasts of games that
do not compete with personal or television attendance at other games. Id. at 3. The
total number of games televised in 1982 was 228: 106 on the networks and 122
exception telecasts. Id.
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individual schools,14 and the amount of money a school can demand
for telecasting its games.15 In addition, the networks must televise a
certain number of "small college" games, including the Division II
and Division III championships. 16
Major football powers, such as Georgia and Oklahoma, contend
that they could command more network appearances per season and
more money per appearance if they were not restricted by the con-
tracts.' 7 At the same time, they do not wish to resign from the NCAA
because they would no longer be allowed to participate in NCAA-
sanctioned competition in other sports.
The plaintiffs challenged the Plan and contracts under several anti-
trust theories and sought a permanent injunction against the NCAA.'S
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs on all counts, holding that
the Plan and contracts constituted per se illegal price fixing and
boycotts, monopolized the market in Saturday afternoon college foot-
ball telecasts and unreasonably restrained trade. 9 The court brushed
aside considerations of the noncommercial goals of the television regu-
lations on the premise that colleges are "big business" because they
"are in competition for students, for faculty, for government grants,
and for philanthropic support. 2 0 The court then voided the Plan and
contracts, and enjoined the NCAA from making any contract of a
similar kind in the future or from interfering with members' sales of
television rights.2'
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed on somewhat
narrower grounds. The court characterized the limitation on the
number of games that can be televised as a reduction of output, which
14. A single team is limited to six appearances on network telecasts in any two
seasons. 707 F.2d at 1150. Such appearances "must be divided evenly between ABC
and CBS." Id. Turner Broadcasting is then "permitted to ... cablecast ... games
not selected by ABC or CBS." Id.
15. The contracts establish a "minimum aggregate compensation" that the net-
works must pay for appearances over the life of the contract and eliminate bidding
among the networks for specific games. Id. The current contracts require ABC and
CBS each to pay $131,750,000 in compensation to schools during the four-year term
of the contract. Id.
16. Id. The NCAA divides member schools into divisions that reflect the school's
size and the extent of its intercollegiate athletic programs. Division I consists of the
approximately 275 schools with the largest athletic programs; for football, this
division is subdivided into Divisions I-A and I-AA, with most major football powers
grouped in Division I-A. Divisions II and III include approximately 500 schools with
smaller athletic programs in terms of budget, scholarships and participants. 546 F.
Supp. at 1287.
17. Id. at 1282, 1285-86.
18. See id. at 1281-82.
19. Id. at 1311, 1313, 1319, 1323.
20. Id. at 1288.
21. Id. at 1326-27.
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it held to be tantamount to per se unlawful price fixing.22 The court
also held that, given the district court's finding that the NCAA pos-
sesses market power in Saturday afternoon telecasts of college foot-
ball, the plan and contracts unreasonably restrained trade by elimi-
nating competition for telecasts of single games. 23 Noting that
"[n]oneconomic considerations, however worthy, cannot be used to
justify restraints that adversely affect competition, 2 4 the court left the
district court's injunction in effect, but remanded the case for recon-
sideration of the relief to possibly allow the NCAA a limited role in
regulating television appearances by its members.2 .
Judge Barrett argued in his dissent that the challenged NCAA rules
should be upheld under the rule of reason.2 6 He recognized the inevi-
table tension that must accompany efforts to balance the interests of
some schools in receiving "the additional monetary rewards that their
excellent football programs command in national television" with
other schools' concerns that "restraints ... are necessary to maintain
intercollegiate football as amateur competition. -2 7
Judge Barrett stressed the noncommercial, educational character of
the NCAA and its members, and the caution that must be exercised in
applying to them antitrust doctrines that "have involved true competi-
tive business enterprises . . . where the goal is exclusively that of
seeking a profit from the product or service offered to the public."28
He concluded that the fundamental noncommercial goals of the
NCAA and its members fully justified the challenged "restraints. 2 9
C. The Noncommercial Interests At Stake
Both courts in NCAA expressly distinguished the NCAA rules that
they deemed praiseworthy-requirements of amateurism, setting
playing rules and schedules, regulating athletic scholarships, recruit-
ing, and coaching staffs-from the television rules they condemned. 30
Moreover, the courts refused to consider the NCAA's argument that
the television rules foster the preservation of amateurism. 31 Thus, left
unaddressed were educational goals that the Plan and contracts seek
22. 707 F.2d at 1152-53.
23. Id. at 1158-60.
24. Id. at 1154.
25. Id. at 1162. Justice White, sitting as Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit,
stayed the injunction pending review by the Supreme Court. NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 104 S. Ct. 1 (White, Circuit Justice 1983). Justice White, coincidentally,
was an All-American football player at the University of Colorado.
26. 707 F.2dat 1162-68 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1165.
28. Id. at 1167.
29. Id. at 1168 (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 1153-54; 546 F. Supp. at 1288.
31. 707 F.2d at 1154; 546 F. Supp. at 1316.
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to promote: spreading limited television revenues among many
schools, in order to decrease incentives for strong football teams to
become professional and to fund athletics at schools with weaker
teams; requiring the telecasting of games between smaller schools in
which students, alumni and friends take pride; and promoting com-
petitive football among many and varied amateur teams nation-
wide.32
Before the Supreme Court, however, the NCAA has chosen not to
argue the significance of the noncommercial interests of colleges in
regulating telecasting of their athletes. Instead, it focuses upon eco-
nomic-based antitrust arguments familiar from cases involving profes-
sional sports leagues and other businesses. 33 These arguments charac-
terize the NCAA as a joint venture and stress the pro-competitive,
output-enhancing character of the Plan and contracts. 34 Accordingly,
a critical issue-whether the traditional goals and character of college
football can survive without some restraints on television broadcast
activities-may entirely elude judicial consideration.
Even in the context of antitrust analysis, noncommercial values are
worthy of consideration. Pursuit of television exposure and revenues
can exert pressures having damaging consequences for educational
institutions. Mounting commercial and professional influences in-
crease the pressure to win, threatening a school's educational stan-
dards and practices. Increased emphasis upon success in intercolle-
giate football can adversely affect a school's admission standards,
distribution of financial aid and scholarship funds among students,
academic standards for promotion and athletic eligibility, and the
allocation of the institution's resources among educational and extra-
curricular programs. Concern about such consequences has long been
a major factor underlying the efforts of colleges and universities to
preserve the special amateur, noncommercial character of intercolle-
giate athletics.
II. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF PER SE RULES
A. Agreements Among Educational Associations Beyond the
Scope of the Sherman Act
The decision of the lower courts in NCAA that the NCAA plan and
contracts are per se unlawful represents a dramatic departure from
precedent. The distinctive goals of educational institutions tradition-
ally have been accorded special consideration by courts35 and even by
32. See Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 135,
136-38 (1973-1974) (educational goals envisioned by NCAA).
33. See Brief for Petitioner at 8-10, NCAA.
34. Id.
35. See infra pts. II (A), (B).
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Congress. 36 Agreements among such institutions that have been chal-
lenged under the antitrust laws have either been held to be outside the
scope of the Sherman Act or have been analyzed under the rule of
reason .
3 7
In the former category, courts have rejected the view that associa-
tions of colleges are analogous to trade associations regulating compe-
tition in a commercial market. In the leading case of Marjorie Web-
ster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc.,38 for example, the defendant association
refused to accredit any institution of higher education that was not "a
non-profit organization with a governing board representing the pub-
lic interest. 39 Despite the serious impact of the association's rules on
proprietary schools, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had little difficulty in upholding the restriction. Noting that the na-
ture of the association's activities "require[s] a finer analysis" '40 than
that appropriate for business organizations, the court held that the
pursuit of educational objectives was not encompassed by the Sher-
man Act.41 Moreover, restrictions on accreditation should be closely
scrutinized under the antitrust laws only when it is plain that the
regulations have a purely commercial motive.42
In holding that the antitrust laws do not apply to agreements
among schools that have an educational purpose, the court relied on
classic Supreme Court expositions of the limits to the coverage of the
Sherman Act. For example, in declaring the Act inapplicable to most
labor union activities, the Supreme Court had discerned an exclusive
concern in the Act's legislative history for the effect of" 'trusts' and of
'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and directed to
control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing
36. See Education Amendments of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), which state:
[I]t is the responsibility of the Federal Government, consistent with the
rights, duties, and privileges of States and institutions of higher education,
to promote ... the efficient use of resources in postsecondary education,
and the optimal allocation of human, physical and financial resources,
through efficient planning and management to achieve these goals ....
Id. These amendments had as their goal full educational opportunity. The bill
established and continued programs designed to afford students access to a multitude
of post-secondary educational institutions and to encourage institutions to provide a
wide range of educational opportunities. H.R. Rep. No. 96-520, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3141, 3145. To the extent that the
NCAA organizes and encourages collegiate athletic competition at all levels it sup-
ports these goals.
37. See infra pt. II(B).
38. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
39. Id. at 652-53.
40. Id. at 653.
41. See id. at 654-55.
42. Id.
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of goods and services. ' 43 The Court later explained this holding as a
recognition "that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having
commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to
organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objec-
tives." 44 The Marjorie Webster court thus had strong support for its
conclusion that "the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were
'tailored ... for the business world,' not for the noncommercial
aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions." 4-
Constitutional considerations fortify the view that agreements
among institutions of higher learning directed toward academic pur-
poses should not be subject to the full potential reach of the Sherman
Act. Courts have recognized that boycotts having commercial conse-
quences, but arising from collective activities having noncommmer-
cial political and social objectives, require careful accommodation of
the policies of the Sherman Act to first amendment freedoms of associ-
ation and speech. 46 Similarly, in pursuing educational objectives and
setting educational policies, colleges and universities enjoy the aca-
demic freedom fostered and protected by the first amendment. 47 Al-
though these constitutional values are not so directly embodied in the
commercial aspects of NCAA television rules that the antitrust laws
cannot apply, neither are they so attenuated that educational policies
concerning the role of athletics in college life should be ignored by
application of a rigid per se rule.
B. The Proper Scope of Antitrust Analysis for Agreements
Among Educational Institutions
The "finer analysis" of the sort called for in Marjorie Webster has
been performed by courts in evaluating collegiate athletic rules. One
43. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940), quoted in Marjorie
Webster, 432 F.2d at 654.
44. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959), quoted
in Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d at 654.
45. Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d at 654 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)). The Noerr doctrine,
that combinations to pursue political objectives do not violate the Sherman Act, 365
U.S. at 136, itself supports the general view that noncommercial objectives should be
treated distinctly.
46. See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 304
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-15 (1982) (boycott to influence government action
protected by first amendment).
47. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.); see generally Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tex.
L. Rev. 817 (1983) (discussing the interrelationship of the individual's right to be free
to pursue academic goals and the right of institutions to pursue their own goals);
Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 879, 882-84 (1979) (discussing the Bakke decision).
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court, for example, held that NCAA rules governing eligibility and
amateurism should not be regarded as business or commercial activity
subject to the Sherman Act, even though application of the rules
effectively barred the plaintiff from participating in intercollegiate
sports events. 48
When the commercial significance of joint educational regulation
makes inappropriate any outright exemption from the Sherman Act's
application, the courts have applied the rule of reason. 49 Indeed,
several courts that have directly addressed NCAA regulations have
followed a rule of reason approach in carefully assessing the relation-
ship between noncommercial educational interests and the commer-
cial aspect of the challenged restraints. 50 Only when colleges pursue
agreements with purely commercial goals should the antitrust laws
apply under the narrower, economically-focused standards appropri-
ate to business enterprises. 51
Instructive is Hennessey v. NCAA, 52 which upheld, against an anti-
trust challenge, an NCAA bylaw limiting the size of school coaching
staffs. 53 The court first held that an educational exemption for NCAA
activities would be inappropriate given that the NCAA's presentation
of "amateur athletics to a ticket-paying, television-buying public [in-
volves] a business venture of far greater magnitude than the vast
majority of 'profit-making' enterprises. '54 The court nonetheless re-
jected the per se approach in favor of a rule of reason evaluation,
relying on the nature and purpose of the NCAA to protect the educa-
tional objectives of member institutions. 5  Balancing the commercial
48. Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass.
1975); see College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, 1975-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,117, at 65,267.
49. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v.
NCAA, No. 83-552, slip op. (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 1983); Association for Intercollegiate
Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 494-95 (D.D.C. 1983); Board of
Regents v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 505-06 (Okla. 1977); cf. Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v.
United States Tennis Assocs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1114-15 (D. Neb.) (activities
of amateur sports association examined under rule of reason), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1981); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310, 314 (W.D.N.Y.
1977) (same).
50. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
51. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970). The Marjorie Webster court gave an example: "[Ilf accreditation were
denied any institution purchasing textbooks from a supplier who did not provide
special discounts for association members, it would be hard to imagine other than a
commercial motive for the action." Id. at 655 n.21.
52. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 1154; accord Board of Regents v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 505-07 (Okla.
1977).
54. 564 F.2d at 1149 n.14.
55. Id. at 1152-53. To be distinguished are the many cases in which a court
determines that the rule of reason is appropriate because of the type of activity
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impact of the restriction against its fundamental objectives of "pre-
serv[ing] and foster[ing] competition in intercollegiate athletics" and
"reorient[ing] the programs into their traditional role as amateur
sports operating as part of the educational processes,' 56 the court
determined that the bylaw was reasonable. 57
Significantly, the only court to examine NCAA television rules prior
to NCAA followed the Hennessey approach. In Warner Amex Cable
Communications, Inc. v. ABC,-8 the plaintiffs sought to restrain the
NCAA and ABC from preventing cablecasts of Ohio State University
football games. 59 The court rejected a per se analysis, stating that "a
practice that would be declared invalid per se if it occurred in a purely
commercial context should not be subject to a per se rule in the context
of singularly integrated commercial and educational activities with
which no court has had considerable experience." 60 The court appar-
ently borrowed this language from the Supreme Court's decision in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,61 in which the Court cautioned that
"[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business rela-
tionships that courts classify them as per se violations."6 2 The Warner
challenged. For example, although courts routinely apply the per se rule to price
fixing agreements, see, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 347 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per
curiam), they are often more reluctant to do so in group boycott situations, see, e.g.,
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980); E.A.
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-
87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). In Hennessey, by contrast, the
court held that the rule of reason was proper not because of the specific nature of the
practice, but on the basis that the important goals of the NCAA would be overlooked
under a rigid, per se analysis. 564 F.2d at 1152-53.
56. 564 F.2d at 1153.
57. Id. at 1154.
58. 499 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
59. Id. at 539.
60. Id. at 545.
61. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
62. Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972)). In Broadcast Music, the Court held that blanket licenses granting broadcast
and performance rights of copyrighted musical compositions must be analyzed under
the rule of reason, despite the fact that the license fee was set by the licensing
organization and thus appeared to be a form of per se illegal price fixing. Id. at 8-9,
24-25. The Court rejected the per se approach, holding that the blanket license was
not on its face anticompetitive because: (1) it increased competition by creating a
unique, different product; (2) it had received congressional approval when Congress
provided for its use in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982); (3) it resembled a joint venture; and (4) alternatives to the license existed. Id.
at 15, 20-24.
The lower courts in NCAA rejected the argument presented by the NCAA that
televised college football is a joint venture similar in nature to the one described in
Broadcast Music. 707 F.2d at 1156; 546 F. Supp. at 1306. The joint venture aspect of
Broadcast Music, however, raised only the procompetitive justifications that are
generally included in a rule of reason analysis. See 441 U.S. at 22-23. In cases like
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court properly focused upon the unique and integrated nature of the
challenged activity, and concluded that a more flexible analysis than
that available under a per se approach was required.6 3
III. EDUCATIONAL VALUES IN RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
The conclusion that the NCAA regulations "should be subjected to a
more discriminating examination under the rule of reason" 64 does not
resolve whether the challenged restraints will "ultimately survive that
attack."65 While the courts in NCAA purported to consider rule of
reason questions, they did not undertake the "discriminating examina-
tion" that is required. 66 The court of appeals refused to consider what
it called "'noneconomic justification" for restraints that the NCAA
contended were ancillary to its legitimate noncommercial objectives. 67
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,68 the court of appeals agreed with
the district court that the NCAA's contentions boiled down to the
argument that "competition will destroy the market."'69 Rejecting this
contention, the court went on to state that "[t]he Sherman Act will
not countenance an argument that the nature of a product or an
industry structure is such that something other than competition is
desirable. "7
The focus of the parties and the courts in NCAA on the economic
aspects of intercollegiate football seems to arise from the view that the
Supreme Court in Professional Engineers implicitly forbade consider-
ation of values of education or amateurism. This is a serious error that
derives from a literal application of the Supreme Court's language to a
context completely different from that involved in Professional Engi-
neers.
Professional Engineers reaffirmed, in the context of a total ban on
competitive bidding imposed by an association of engineers engaged
NCAA, the court should not concern itself solely with whether the alleged restraints
are anticompetitive or procompetitive, but also should address whether any impair-
ment of competition is justified by more educational values.
63. 499 F. Supp. at 545-46.
64. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
65. Id. at 24; cf. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("test
of legality is whether the restraint ... merely regulates and ... promotes competi-
tion ... or destroy[s] competition").
66. See 707 F.2d at 1157-60; 546 F. Supp. at 1313-19.
67. 707 F.2d at 1154 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-96 (1978)). "Ancillary" restraints are those which are
"merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect
the covenantee in the legitimate fruits of the contract." United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
68. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
69. 707 F.2d at 1154; 546 F. Supp. at 1306-08.
70. 707 F.2d at 1154.
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in standard commercial activities,71 the principle that rule of reason
analysis ordinarily focuses on "competitive conditions" and "economic
conceptions. 72 Such a focus ensures that courts do not consider gener-
alized arguments that economic competition is not in the public inter-
est, which are inappropriate because a contrary "policy decision has
been made by the Congress" 73 through the antitrust laws. Thus, the
rule of reason "does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any
argument in favor of a challenged restraint, ' 74 even if, as in Profes-
sional Engineers, the restraint is purportedly adopted to minimize the
risk that competition would produce work endangering the public
safety. 75
Reliance on Professional Engineers to forbid noneconomic justifica-
tions for athletic agreements among educational institutions, how-
ever, is misplaced. Although the petitioner in Professional Engineers
could assert laudable and ethical justifications for its restraint on price
competition, it could not categorize the engineering profession as
anything other than a profit-motivated business. 76 This overriding
commercial purpose of their day-to-day activities is what distinguishes
engineers, as well as lawyers, 77 doctors78 and businessmen, 79 from
educational institutions.
71. 435 U.S. at 692, 696.
72. Id. at 690 & n.16.
73. Id. at 692.
74. Id. at 688.
75. Id. at 693. The Society argued that the purpose of the ban on competitive
bidding was a fear that selection of engineering services on the basis of price would
tempt engineers to lower costs by doing "inferior work" thus endangering "public
safety and health." Id.
76. See id. at 696.
77. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court
held subject to the Sherman Act a minimum fee schedule for lawyers published and
enforced by county and state bar associations, stating that "[iut is no disparagement
of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect."
Id. at 788. The Court, however, cautioned:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular re-
straint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and auto-
matically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.
Id. at 788 n. 17. This caveat applies with even greater force to institutions of higher
education, which are not conducted on a profit-making basis and which execute
social duties of the highest importance-advanced education of young adults and
disinterested scholarship-that cannot practically support themselves financially.
78. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the
Supreme Court held per se illegal maximum fee agreements among member-physi-
cians of two foundations offering "alternative" medical services. Id. at 356-57. The
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Moreover, courts have not insisted after Professional Engineers that
all organizations, regardless of their character and objectives, must
pass muster under the same competitive criteria and economic tests. °
The Supreme Court itself has recently acknowledged that "certain
activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by
private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a
local government." 8' Such cases recognize that noncommercial values
must be given weight in analyzing the practices of noncommercial
institutions and organizations that have some commercial conse-
quences.
The insistence on conducting an analysis of college athletic regula-
tions solely in the cant of economic antitrust analysis produces incon-
gruous statements and murky thinking clothed with the false precision
of jargon.8 2 Thus, the court of appeals in NCAA described the choice
by television executives of which game to televise as interbrand com-
petition in the network programming market.8 3 Northwestern or
Princeton graduates, just to choose examples, would perhaps be sur-
prised to learn that their universities are brands; they would need to
puzzle out whether they themselves are consumers or products.
This single-minded pursuit of competitive criteria results in error as
well as comedy. The court of appeals, for example, implicitly ap-
proved the district court's economic-based conclusions84 that the exist-
ing "power elite" among college football teams must be accepted as afait accompli, that nothing prevents other teams from "break[ing] into
this elite group," and that "the free market should and will resolve the
Court rejected the contention that the agreements were reasonable because they were
entered into by professionals performing a public service. Rather, the Court noted
that "the claim that the price restraint will make it easier for customers to pay does
not distinguish the medical profession from any other provider of goods or services."
Id. at 349.
79. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) (per
curiam) (agreement among competing wholesalers to refuse to extend credit is un-
lawful per se because such a practice is "tantamount to an agreement to eliminate
discounts, and thus falls squarely within the traditional per se rule against price
fixing").
80. See supra note 46.
81. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.20(1982) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 417
n.48 (1978)); see Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
65,883, at 67,718 (Dec. 16, 1983).
82. Every market by definition embraces consumers whose welfare can be maxi-
mized. Pure economic analysis suggests that the consumers in the NCAA case are the
television viewers. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, NCAA.
Thus enthroned, the interests of television viewers will inevitably prevail in the
economic calculus over the interests of the athletes, students, faculty or school
administrators. By such "a process of reasoning, the economic analysis supercedes all
other substantive considerations.
83. 707 F.2d at 1155.
84. Id. at 1154.
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problem" if competitive balance and amateurism are threatened by
growing commercialization and professionalism among the "power
elite." 85 Those courts, in other words, equated competition on the
gridiron with commercial competition in holding that the Sherman
Act applies with full vigor to athletic competition among schools.
Other courts have clearly recognized that "[t]he 'competition' which
the [NCAA] seeks to protect does not originate in the market place or
as a sector of the economy but in the [stadium] as part of the educa-
tional program of a major university."86
The effect of the Sherman Act simply cannot be to force all con-
certed human action to justify itself solely in terms of allocative effi-
ciency.8 7 Such a reading ignores Supreme Court decisions specifying
that the Sherman Act is "tailored . . . for the business world,"88 and
that it aims "primarily at combinations having commercial objectives
and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which
normally have other objectives." 9 Moreover, such a reading would
most certainly expand the Sherman Act far beyond the arena in which
the Fifty-first Congress thought it would operate. 90
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should adopt the "finer analysis" that hereto-
fore has governed application of the Sherman Act to educational
85. 546 F. Supp. at 1310-11.
86. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975); see Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977); Association for Intercollegiate Athletics
for Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 494-95 (D.D.C. 1983).
87. One student commentator has argued that noncommercial values should not
be weighed by courts in evaluating NCAA regulations under the rule of reason
because the Sherman Act does not provide guidance to courts as to how to balance
economic and noneconomic values. See Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note
8, at 668. The Sherman Act, however, provides little guidance as to how different
economic values should be balanced, and courts routinely balance complex social
values in numerous legal contexts, including constitutional cases. Moreover, ignoring
educational values in antitrust analysis of agreements among colleges is socially
unrealistic and destructive.
88. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 141 (1961), quoted in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
89. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959),
quoted in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970); see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); Ponsoldt, The Application
of Sherman Act Antiboycott Law to Industry Self-Regulation: An Analysis Integrat-
ing Nonboycott Sherman Act Principles, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1981).
90. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. See generally W. Thornton,
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1-31 (1913) (congressional debates prior to enactment of
Sherman Act).
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entities. Courts must weigh in the balance the financial and commer-
cial pressures that "threaten both the competitive, and the amateur,
nature of the programs, leading quite possibly to abandonment by
many." 9' It is important to recognize that NCAA regulations such as
those challenged in NCAA do not arise in a "purely commercial
context" and that special consideration must be accorded to the "sin-
gularly integrated commercial and educational activities" at issue.
Perhaps such an analysis would conclude that the NCAA's regulations
do transgress the rule of reason; such a decision, however, would be
based on a carefully considered weighing of all the important eco-
nomic and noneconomic values that are at stake.
91. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977).
